
ILC Dover’s Record $13M Cyber False Claims Act Settlement Shows Where Self-Attestations Can Go Wrong
On November 3, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that defense and aerospace companies ILC Dover LP and ILC Astrospace LLC, of Frederica, Delaware, agreed to pay $13 million to resolve False Claims Act (FCA) allegations that they failed to meet the cybersecurity requirements in their contracts with the Department of the Army, the Missile Defense Agency, and NASA.
The settlement agreement resolves a whistleblower (qui tam) lawsuit filed by Philip Root, ILC's former Director of Cybersecurity, who will receive $2.35 million of the recovery. Of the $13 million, $6.5 million is identified as restitution.
The settlement was announced one week before November 10, 2026, the date CMMC Phase 2 had been scheduled to begin before the Department of War (DoW) paused the transition to Phase 2. While FCA cases are rare, this is the largest cybersecurity FCA resolution to date and a stark reminder that the pause did not reduce contractors’ cybersecurity obligations. In fact, the requirements at issue were in ILC's contracts years before any CMMC assessment requirement existed, and they are still in defense contracts today.
Recommended reading
Honeywell Aerospace's $2M Settlement Shows the Government Doesn't Need CMMC Phase 2 to Enforce NIST 800-171
What did DOJ allege against ILC Dover and ILC Astrospace?
DOJ alleged that from January 2018 to October 2024, ILC Dover and ILC Astrospace (together, ILC) submitted claims for payment on Army, Missile Defense Agency, and NASA contracts while knowing they had not met those contracts' cybersecurity requirements. According to the DOJ release, the alleged gaps were:
1. Cloud storage that did not meet federal requirements
Alleged period: February 2023 to October 2024
ILC allegedly stored controlled unclassified information (CUI) with a third-party cloud provider without ensuring the provider met security requirements equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline, or the Department of Defense (DoD) requirements under DFARS 252.204-7012 for incident reporting, malicious software, media preservation, forensic access, and damage assessment.
2. No system security plan
Alleged period: January 2018 to March 2022, and September 2022 to October 2024
ILC allegedly did not develop, document, and periodically update a system security plan (SSP) for each covered information system.
3. Controls not fully implemented
Alleged period: January 2018 to October 2024
ILC allegedly had not fully implemented all required NIST SP 800-171 and NIST SP 800-53 controls, including some whose absence could expose the network to exploitation or allow covered defense information to be exfiltrated.
4. No plans of action and milestones
Alleged period: January 2018 to May 2019, and January 2022 to September 2024
ILC allegedly did not develop and implement plans of action and milestones (POA&Ms) to correct deficiencies and reduce vulnerabilities.
5. No current assessment on file with DoD
Alleged period: November 2020 to October 2024
ILC Astrospace allegedly had not submitted any current assessment of its NIST SP 800-171 implementation. ILC Dover allegedly had not submitted one that was current, based on a review of its SSP, and conducted under the NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Methodology. These are the assessments contractors post to the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS).
Recommended reading
SPRS Scoring: How to Get a Current CMMC Status and Stay Eligible for Defense Contracts
Why does this settlement matter while CMMC Phase 2 is paused?
It matters because none of the alleged failures depended on the CMMC rollout.
The alleged conduct in the ILC matter ended in October 2024, more than a year before CMMC Phase 1 began. As with the Honeywell Aerospace settlement earlier this year, the government relied on contract requirements that predate CMMC, including DFARS 252.204-7012, 7019, and 7020, and on the FCA, to pursue the case.
That is worth keeping in mind now that many contractors are using self-assessments and affirmations to prove they’re adhering to underlying cybersecurity requirements, including NIST 800-171. A contractor represents that it has an SSP, that it has implemented the required controls, that POA&Ms exist where they are needed, and that its SPRS score reflects its actual environment. When those representations are inaccurate and the company continues to bill the government, the FCA is one of the tools available to DOJ to pursue it.
It also helps to keep the scale in perspective. By one law firm's count, this is the 17th settlement under DOJ's Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative since 2021, across a defense industrial base of hundreds of thousands of companies. Enforcement is real, but it is not frequent, and the stronger reasons to get secure and stay compliant are still contract eligibility, prime contractor expectations, data protection, and operational resilience.
The federal officials quoted in the DOJ announcement framed the case the same way, around the risk to defense information.

“Cybersecurity lapses place critical defense information at risk,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Jessica Herrington of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Northeast Field Office. “DCIS remains committed to ensuring that companies entrusted with sensitive data fully meet the security obligations outlined in their federal contracts. This settlement reflects our continued efforts to safeguard the Department of Defense’s information and hold contractors accountable when they fail to uphold required cybersecurity standards.”
Recommended reading
CMMC Phase 2 Paused: What Still Applies & What the DoW, Primes & RFI Responses Signal About Potential Reform
5 key takeaways from the ILC settlement for defense contractors
A few specifics from this case translate into practical checks:
Takeaway 1: Your SPRS score is a representation
A missing or outdated assessment, or one that is not based on a real SSP, is what the government alleged here.
The settlement agreement adds detail. The government contends that ILC's third-party cybersecurity consultants told the company in November 2018, and again in September 2024, that it had not implemented dozens of cybersecurity controls. Those gaps would have produced NIST SP 800-171 scores of -59 and 21, respectively, if ILC had an SSP in place that allowed a score to be calculated. The agreement also states that ILC did not report those scores or vulnerabilities to DoD.
Separately, Root's qui tam complaint alleges that ILC Dover had posted an SPRS score of 100 on November 6, 2020.
The June 2026 Cyber AB Town Hall covered a similar pattern in the LOGZONE matter, where a self-reported score of 110 was followed by a government assessment score of -170.
Not sure your SPRS score matches your environment? See where your gaps are against CMMC Level 1 or Level 2 in a few minutes with our free CMMC Gap Assessment tool.
Takeaway 2: Cloud choices are compliance decisions
The allegation that CUI sat with a provider that had not been shown to meet FedRAMP Moderate-equivalent requirements is a reminder to confirm the authorization status of every cloud service that stores, processes, or transmits CUI. The May 2026 Cyber AB Town Hall explains when a provider counts as a cloud service provider for this purpose.
Takeaway 3: Your SSP and POA&Ms must reflect your current environment
The absence of these documents was alleged across most of the period. They are the record that would likely be examined if the accuracy of a compliance claim were ever questioned, so they need to reflect the environment as it is today.
Takeaway 4: Cybersecurity obligations can transfer in an acquisition
ILC's parent company, Ingersoll Rand, told CyberScoop that it inherited the matter when it acquired the business. Contractors that are buying or being bought may want to treat SSPs, POA&M status, and SPRS scores as part of due diligence.
Takeaway 5: Internal concerns need a documented response
The whistleblower was the company's own former Director of Cybersecurity, and according to the qui tam complaint, he alleged that he raised the noncompliance internally and that ILC did not act on it.
Insider whistleblowers are common in these settlements, which makes it important to track and resolve the issues your own team raises.
“Strict compliance with federal cybersecurity standards is non-negotiable for any company doing business with NASA,” said Robert Steinau, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations at the NASA Office of Inspector General. “Those who jeopardize America’s space program by ignoring government protocols will incur steep financial penalties. We are grateful to whistleblowers who do right by reporting these wrongs.”

What contractors should focus on now
Contractors can use the pause to close gaps before verification requirements return in some form. A reasonable starting list:
- Confirm that your SPRS score is current and that it matches a current SSP. If you do not have an SSP yet, this CMMC SSP template is a starting point.
- Run or refresh a gap analysis against NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2, starting with the free CMMC Gap Assessment if you need a quick read on where you stand, so that every open item has a POA&M with an owner and a date.
- Verify that every environment holding CUI meets the required cloud standards.
- Keep working toward CMMC Level 2 readiness. If you are unsure which requirements apply to your contracts, start with who needs CMMC.
When the CMMC Reform Task Force recommendations are published and the path forward is clearer, contractors that kept their documentation and scores accurate will likely be in the best position to respond.
The ILC settlement is not a reason for alarm. It is a reminder that the cybersecurity requirements written into defense contracts are still in force during the pause, and that the accuracy of what a contractor reports about them still matters.
If you want assurance that your self-assessment, SSP, and SPRS score would hold up under scrutiny, talk to a CMMC expert about your current cybersecurity program.